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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
balancing approach, and did not expressly limit its holding to the
specific context of the case." Rather, the appellate division merely
set forth the general rule that an individual who conducts continu-
ous business activity within the state is subject to in personam
jurisdiction with respect to causes of action not related to that activ-
ity.4' It is hoped that this holding does not signal an unrestricted
extension of the doing business jurisdictional predicate. New York
has in the past adhered to a "wise policy . . . [of refraining] from
imposing its jurisdiction too easily and unjustly upon nonresident
individuals .... ,,"2 It would be unfortunate if the New York courts
retreated from this position.
ARTICLE 32-ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3211: Court of Appeals limits use of affidavits where motion
to dismiss is not converted into motion for summary judgment.
CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits a party to move for judgment dis-
missing a complaint if "the pleading fails to state a cause of ac-
tion. 43 Subdivision (c) of CPLR 3211 further provides that upon the
hearing of this motion, the parties may submit any evidence that a
court could consider on a motion for summary judgment.4 Since the
submission of an affidavit in support of a motion for summary judg-
ment is mandatory,45 the courts have permitted the use of affidavits
on a motion to dismiss made pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7).1 Re-
cently, however, in Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co.,4" a divided Court
:0 52 App. Div. 2d at 440, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
1 Id.
42 85 Misc. 2d at 470, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
CPLR 3211(a)(7) provides: "A party may move for judgment dismissing one or more
causes of action asserted against him on the ground that: . . . the pleading fails to state a
cause of action . .. ."
44 CPLR 3211(c) provides: "Upon the hearing of a motion made under subdivision (a)
. . . either party may submit any evidence that could properly be considered on a motion
for summary judgment ....
45 CPLR 3212(b) provides in pertinent part: "A motion for summary judgment shall be
supported by affidavit. . ....
" In Rapoport v. Schneider, 29 N.Y.2d 396, 401, 278 N.E.2d 642, 645, 328 N.Y.S.2d 431,
436 (1972), the Court of Appeals utilized the facts contained in defendant's affidavit in
considering a motion to dismiss. For some of the lower court cases in which the court allowed
submission of affidavits to support a motion to dismiss, see Rappaport v. International
Playtex Corp., 43 App. Div. 2d 393, 352 N.Y.S.2d 241 (3d Dep't 1974); Hamilton Printing
Co. v. Ernest Payne Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 876, 273 N.Y.S.2d 929 (3d Dep't 1966) (mem.);
Epps v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 21 App. Div. 2d 798, 250 N.Y.S.2d 751 (2d Dep't 1964)
(mem.).
47 40 N.Y.2d 633, 357 N.E.2d 970, 389 N.Y.S.2d 314 (per curiam), rev'g 51 App. Div. 2d
562, 378 N.Y.S.2d 740 (2d Dep't 1976) (mem.).
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of Appeals held that unless a motion made under CPLR 3211(a)(7)
is converted into one for summary judgment, affidavits normally
may be considered only for the limited purpose of remedying defects
in the complaint."
In Rovello, plaintiff purchaser sought specific performance of a
contract for the sale of stock in a real estate company." Defendants
moved to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state
a cause of action. In support of this motion, defendants submitted
affidavits alleging that plaintiff had failed to perform a condition
precedent, viz, the tender of the required downpayment 5 Plaintiff's
counsel submitted an affidavit in opposition which tacitly admitted
the failure to perform the condition precedent by contending that
the nonperformance was either consented to, excusable, or the fault
of one of the defendants. 51 The motion to dismiss was denied by the
trial court, but subsequently reversed by the appellate division.52
In concluding that the trial court had correctly denied the mo-
tion, the Rovello Court noted the procedural distinction between the
motion for summary judgment and the motion to dismiss for failure
to state a cause of action.-3 The former requires the disclosure of all
evidence pertaining to the issues in dispute, the Court stated, while
the latter permits the plaintiff to stand on his pleading. Where the
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is converted
to one for summary judgment, however, the plaintiff must make an
evidentiary showing or suffer summary judgment. 5 Focusing upon
' 40 N.Y.2d at 636, 357 N.E.2d at 972, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
" Id. at 633, 357 N.E.2d at 971, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
The plaintiff is not required to plead conditions precedent to the contract in his
complaint. The defendant must raise the issue specifically. CPLR 3015(a). Once the defen-
dant has raised the issue, the plaintiff has the burden of proof on the issue. See CPLR 3015,
commentary at 58 (McKinney 1974).
11 In the agreement, the plaintiff was to tender a downpayment of $5,700 within 16
months of the agreement. No payment was made until after 3 years had passed and then the
amount tendered was only $1,870. For this failure to meet the condition, the plaintiff offered,
alternatively, three excuses: First, the untimely death of his partner (the death having oc-
curred after the 16-month period had elapsed); second, his own absence from the jurisdiction
during the period (although by his admission this was only 22 1/2% of the time); and third,
that defendant consented to an extension of time. 40 N.Y.2d at 637-38, 357 N.E.2d at 973-
74, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 317-18 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
' 51 App. Div. 2d 562, 378 N.Y.S.2d 740.
40 N.Y.2d at 635, 357 N.E.2d at 972, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
5' Id.
CPLR 3211(c) provides that the court, in its discretion, may convert the motion to
dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. If it does, the general summary judgment require-
ments of CPLR 3212 are brought to bear for the disposition of the motion. If the motion is
then granted the judgment is generally entitled to full res judicata effect. See CPLR 3211,
commentary at 74 (McKinney 1970).
1977]
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this distinction, the Rovello Court emphasized the importance of
CPLR 3211(c) which provides that where the court treats a rule
3211(a)(7) motion as one for summary judgment, the parties must
be given adequate notice." Since notice need not be given where the
court does not convert the motion, the Rovello Court determined
that in that instance submitted affidavits were not to be examined
for evidentiary support. 7 Instead, the Court stated that, in general,
affidavits which accompany a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion may be re-
ceived only for the limited purpose of remedying defects in the
pleading.58 The Court of Appeals did acknowledge, however, that in
rare instances where defendant's or plaintiff's affidavits "establish
conclusively that plaintiff has no cause of action," the affidavits
may be used to support a dismissal."
Judge Wachtler, writing for the dissent, asserted that the ma-
jority had abrogated the statute and revitalized the common law
demurrer. 0 The dissent noted that a motion made pursuant to
CPLR 3211(a)(7) is designed to ensure not only that a plaintiff
states a cause of action, but also that he has one.' Toward this end,
Judge Wachtler stated, rule 3211(a) permits both parties to submit
any evidence which a court could consider on a motion for summary
judgment. Construing this provision as allowing a court to look be-
yond the face of the complaint, the dissent concluded that the par-
ties are free to make an evidentiary showing on the disputed issues
by submitting supporting affidavits.2 The dissent lamented, how-
ever, that "the majority's decision makes it an empty exercise for
the defendant to do so.'"63
0 40 N.Y.2d at 635, 357 N.E.2d at 972, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
'7Id.
" Id. at 636, 357 N.E.2d at 972, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
I d.
Id. at 636, 357 N.E.2d at 973, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 317 (Wachtler, J., dissenting). The
common law demurrer was a device which tested the face of the complaint. Defendant was
deemed to have admitted all of plaintiff's allegations. In answer to the complaint defendant
stated, in effect, that even if true the complaint still failed to state a cause of action. Many
jurisdictions, including New York and the federal courts, have eliminated the common law
demurrer. This was done as part of the reform of American pleadings from fact pleading to
notice pleading. The purpose of this reform was to shift the emphasis of the proceedings from
determination of the technical accuracy of the pleadings to determination of the legal basis
of the claim. Korn & Paley, Survey of Summary Judgment, Judgment on the Pleadings and
Related Pre-Trial Procedures, 42 CoasEL L.Q. 483, 493-96 (1957). See Reppy, The Demur-
rer-At Common Law, Under Modern Codes, Practice Acts, and Rules of Civil Procedure, 3
N.Y.L.F. 175, 199-204 (1957).
61 40 N.Y.2d at 638, 357 N.E.2d at 974, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 318 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
62 Id.
63 Id.
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In reaching its decision the Rovello Court relied heavily on the
1973 amendment of CPLR 3211(c). The amendment requires that
notice be given to the parties prior to converting a motion to dismiss
to a motion for summary judgment." The majority's reliance on the
effect of this amendment as limiting the use of affidavits to remedy-
ing pleading defects appears to be misplaced. At the time of the
1973 amendment, the statute explicitly permitted the court, on a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, to accept
"any evidence that could properly be considered on a motion for
summary judgment." 5 This language has been widely construed as
creating a "speaking motion," which is decided on the basis of both
the pleadings and the evidence submitted." It is submitted that the
1973 amendment was intended only to ensure that parties were
apprised of the conversion of the CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion before
suffering the more drastic effect of summary judgment, and not to
limit the evidence considered by the court."
As the Rovello Court noted, "[m]odern pleading rules are
'designed to focus attention on whether the pleader has a cause of
action rather than on whether he has properly statel one' . . 6
Unfortunately, the Rovello majority appears to have cast aside mod-
em pleading practice in favor of a return to the technical distinc-
tions of the common law. Perhaps, as Dean McLaughlin has pointed
out, the solution to this problem now lies with the motion court.
When it becomes apparent that the plaintiff has no cause of action,
"the court should, on appropriate notice . . . treat the motion as
one for summary judgment and proceed under CPLR 3212."s
" CPLR 3211(c) (McKinney Supp. 1977) (amending CPLR 3211(c) (McKinney 1970)).
CPLR 3211(c).
" See, e.g., note 46 supra; Rapoport v. Schneider, 29 N.Y.2d 396, 401, 278 N.E.2d 642,
645, 328 N.Y.S.2d 431, 436 (1972); 4 WK&M 3211.35, 3212.02, at 32-142.11: CPLR 3211,
commentary at 31 (McKinney 1970). It would appear that CPLR 3211 was intended to
operate as a motion for summary judgment. The Advisory Committee on Practice and Proce-
dure has stated: "It is clear that the motion is in essence one for summary judgment." FIRST
REP. 85. See 4 WK&M 3212.02, at 32-142.11.
1T See N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, NDwrEENr ANNUAL REPORT, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 90
(1974), at 62, wherein it is stated: "[Tihe amendment serves the interests of justice by
requiring that the court apprise the parties, by adequate notice, of its intention to treat the
motion as one for summary judgment. . . ." Since the language regarding accepting extrin-
sic evidence in support of the motion to dismiss remains unaltered by the amendment,
presumably, the cases which allowed the court to accept affidavits, see note 46 supra, also
were not altered by the amendment.
40 N.Y.2d at 636, 357 N.E.2d at 972, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
" McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 177 N.Y.L.J. 10, Jan. 14, 1977, at 4, col. 2.
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